Now comes the scary part what if Twitter and Facebook were the only social media sites you could go to, no longer were you free to seek out other sources and those individuals who's political views were contrary to the social platform were silenced. How would you even know it was happening
I agree with you but Net Neutrality is about usage. If you want to address the monopolies we should start a new thread on Antitrust laws.
The document covers this specifically. While I was skimming trying to give people a balanced reply... I found the following. It's easy to find examples everywhere... in fact, a lot of this was happening during the Net Neutrality era.
I'm trying not to write a thesis here... I guess it is more of a public service.
By the way... I am just searching and skimming to document to help answer your questions.
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/09/marsha-blackburn-twitter-ad-243607 (“
Twitter is barring a top Republican Senate candidate from advertising her campaign launch video on the service because a line about her efforts to investigate Planned Parenthood was deemed “inflammatory.”);
92 See Comcast Comments at 14 (“When a consumer uploads new content to Facebook, for instance, it is not only Facebook that provides the information-processing functionality necessary for such activity; it
is also the BIAS provider whose information-processing capabilities enable consumers to connect and interact with Facebook’s servers in the first place.”). pg. 13
Comcast Reply at 11 (“[T]he definition of
‘information service’ nowhere requires that ISP capabilities be solely responsible for any end-user functionality; it requires only that ISPs ‘offer’ an integrated ‘capability’ beyond mere transmission, which they unquestionably do.”); Cox Reply at 5-6; NCTA Reply at 6-7; Verizon Reply at 32, 34.
Thus, even where an ISP enables end-users to access the content or applications of a third party,
the Commission nonetheless found that constituted the requisite information services “capability.”96 When the Title II Order attempted to evaluate customer perception based on their usage of broadband Internet access service, it failed to persuasively grapple with the relevant implications of prior Commission classification precedent.
The Title II Order argued that broadband Internet access service primarily is used to access content, applications, and services from third parties unaffiliated with the ISP in support of the view that customers perceive it as a separate offering of telecommunications.97 The Title
111. The first instance of actual harm cited by the Title II Order involved
Madison River Communications, a small DSL provider accused in 2005 of blocking ports used for VoIP applications, thereby foreclosing competition to its telephony business. Madison River entered into a consent decree with the Enforcement Bureau, paying $15,000 to the U.S. Treasury and agreeing that it
“shall not block ports used for VoIP applications or otherwise prevent customers from using VoIP applications.”410 Vonage, an over-the-top VoIP provider, later confirmed in press reports that it had initiated a complaint against Madison River at the Commission and that other small ISPs had blocked its VoIP services.411
112.
Next, the Title II Order referenced Comcast’s throttling of BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer networking protocol. Comcast, which was at the time the nation’s second-largest ISP, admitted that it interfered with about a tenth of BitTorrent TCP connections, and independent investigations suggested that Comcast interfered with over half of BitTorrent streams.412 After receiving a formal complaint about the practice, the Commission found “that Comcast’s conduct poses a substantial threat to both the open character and efficient operation of the Internet, and is not reasonable,” and ordered Comcast to cease the interference.413 H
owever, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission’s order in Comcast. 414 113. Madison River and Comcast-BitTorrent—the anecdotes most frequently cited in favor of Title II regulation—demonstrate that any problematic conduct was quite rare.415 The more recent incidents discussed in the Title II Order also show that since 2008, few tangible threats to the openness of the Internet have arisen.416 First, in 2012, AT&T restricted customers on certain data plans from
114. The final example—though not an example of harm to consumers—discussed in the
Title II Order was Comcast’s Xfinity TV application for the Xbox, which was criticized for exempting subscribers from their Comcast data caps. However, the service was provided as a specialized service, similar to certain VoIP and video offerings that use IP but are not delivered via the public Internet.420 Accordingly, the Xfinity Xbox application was not subject to the
2010 or 2015 rules, as it was a so-called “non-BIAS data service.”421 However, the Title II
Order further clouded this carve-out for innovative services by threatening to enforce the rules adopted under the Order against ISPs if it deemed after the fact, that those services were “functional equivalents” of broadband Internet access services, as the Open Internet Order had done in 2010.422
116. Because of the paucity of concrete evidence of harms to the openness of the Internet, the Title II Order426 and its proponents have heavily relied on purely speculative threats.427 We do not believe hypothetical harms,
unsupported by empirical data, economic theory, or even recent anecdotes, provide a basis for public-utility regulation of ISPs.428 Indeed, economic theory demonstrates that many of the practices prohibited by the Title II Order can sometimes harm consumers and sometimes benefit consumers; therefore, it is not accurate to presume that all hypothetical effects are harmful.429
Intrusive, investment-inhibiting Title II regulation requires a showing of actual harms, and after roughly fifteen years of searching, proponents of Title II have found “astonishing[ly]” few.430 Further, the transparency rule we adopt today will require ISPs to clearly disclose such practices and this, coupled with existing consumer protection and antitrust laws, will significantly reduce the likelihood that ISPs will engage in actions that would harm consumers or competition.
To the extent that our approach relying on transparency requirements, consumer protection laws, and antitrust laws does not address all concerns, we find that any remaining unaddressed harms are small relative to the costs of implementing more heavyhanded regulation.
and so on...
I researched the document and did not find... anything close to "we're going to take away your first Amendment". Searching is easy, just do a Control f on the pdf.
if you agree with it great, if you don't agree with great. Either way, as I said, I am being the devil's advocate.
